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Given that all chemical varieties of plutonium can be used in nuclear weapons, sophisticated 
measures are required to disposition it so that its potential to contribute to horizontal and verti-
cal nuclear proliferation is minimised. This article argues that the present options for disposi-
tioning military plutonium are not acceptable, and, as a result, this plutonium should be placed 
in international storage until an acceptable method is found. First, a brief description of pluto-
nium and its use is given. A discussion follows on non-proliferation and feasibility criteria by 
which the policy options to disposition military plutonium should be assessed. Then several 
policy options are outlined and assessed against the specified criteria. Finally, the concept of 
international plutonium storage is described. 
 
Nuclear proliferation includes both horizontal and vertical proliferation activities. Horizontal 
proliferation occurs when states and non-state actors acquire or develop nuclear weapons for 
the first time, and vertical proliferation occurs when nuclear weapon states [34] quantitatively 
expand or qualitatively improve their nuclear arsenals [3].  
Nuclear proliferation is a threat to global security because as the number of nuclear weap-
ons in existence grows so does the likelihood that they will be intentionally or accidentally used 
to seriously imperil human existence. This effect is magnified because instances of proliferation 
increase the likelihood of further proliferation. The appearance of a new nuclear weapon state 
can motivate a regional adversary to undertake further proliferation in response, as in the case 
of Pakistan following India’s lead in the late 1960s [19]. Vertical proliferation also increases the 
likelihood of further proliferation if it is interpreted by state and non-state observers as 
evidence that existing nuclear-weapon states are not sincerely committed to fulfilling their 
legally-mandated disarmament commitments [6]. 
Military plutonium [35] is central to the problem of nuclear proliferation because the theft 
of such material is a possible pathway for horizontal proliferation. Furthermore, plutonium 
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would likely be used in vertical proliferation because it is an essential component in most 
contemporary nuclear weapon designs.  
Arms control initiatives since the end of the Cold War, such as the Strategic Arms Reduc-
tion Treaty, have led to reductions in nuclear arsenals but have failed to address the prolifera-
tion risks related to military plutonium. Nuclear bombers were dismantled and missile compo-
nents were crushed [36]; however, the plutonium from nuclear warheads was left intact [11]. 
Initiatives to restrict exports do not address these aforementioned proliferation risks. Ad 
hoc groups of states rather than the United Nations have implemented export controls, though 
these initiatives have not been effective [15]. In any case, because export controls are focused 
on stopping actors from acquiring either nuclear weapons or the capability to develop them, 
this approach does not address vertical proliferation. 
Even the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), the key component of the international 
nuclear non-proliferation regime, does not fully address these proliferation risks. The NPT 
attempts to ensure that declared non-nuclear-weapon states are not developing nuclear weap-
ons; however, it does not require the protection of military plutonium from unwanted access 
[9]. While there is a requirement for declared nuclear-weapon states to pursue disarmament 
[37], and thus curb their vertical proliferation ambitions, it has not been fully honoured. 
Unlike uranium, plutonium cannot be ‘blended down’ into a form that is not suitable for 
nuclear weapons [6,38]. This technical fact necessitates the development of sophisticated 
measures to disposition the plutonium or change it in some way to minimise its capacity to be 
used in proliferation. One method immobilises plutonium and radioactive waste in large 
containers that are buried in underground repositories. Another method burns a mixture of 
uranium and plutonium in contemporary nuclear power plants. Other proposed methods 
transform plutonium in accelerators, launch it into the sun, or subject it to underground 
nuclear explosions.  
This article argues that the present options to disposition military plutonium do not satisfy 
necessary non-proliferation and feasibility criteria, and, as a result, the international storage of 
this plutonium should be implemented until an acceptable method is found.  
This argument is developed in the following sections. The first section presents a brief 
description of plutonium and its use, the second section discusses the criteria by which disposi-
tion options must be assessed, the third section outlines several approaches and assesses them 
against the specified criteria and the fourth section describes the concept of international 
plutonium storage. 
Much of the discussion about plutonium disposition in academic, government and scien-
tific circles is framed by the activities of Russia and the United States, such as their September 
2000 commitment to dispose of 34 metric tons of weapons-origin plutonium [39]; however, 
since nuclear proliferation is a matter of concern for the entire international community, this 
article addresses the dispositioning of military plutonium in general without restricting its focus 
to the policies of any specific country or countries. 
Background information on plutonium 
Since the technical aspects of plutonium and its use in nuclear weapons have been adequately 
introduced elsewhere [40], the present discussion focuses on a few key points that are directly 
relevant to the following sections. Weapons-grade plutonium refers to a sample of plutonium 
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that is ideally suited for nuclear weapons. As previously mentioned, all forms of plutonium can 
be used in nuclear weapons; however, the development of weapons with non-weapons-grade 
plutonium requires greater ingenuity to overcome losses in efficiency [3]. 
In a nuclear weapon, a massive amount of energy is produced in an extremely short period 
of time from the fission of either uranium or plutonium nuclei in an uncontrolled and rapidly 
multiplying chain reaction. The energy produced in a nuclear power reactor is the result of a 
fission chain reaction under precisely controlled conditions that prevent rapid multiplication. 
In a nuclear reactor that uses uranium fuel, plutonium is an expected by-product and is there-
fore present in its spent fuel [3]. Other by-products of nuclear reactions are highly radioactive 
fission products that are extremely harmful to human health and are believed to protect spent 
fuel from unwanted access [6].  
In 1999, the Institute for Science and International Security estimated the total amount of 
plutonium in military stockpiles around the world to be 250 metric tons [1]. Approximately 
eight kilograms of plutonium is all the plutonium that is required to build a ‘Nagasaki-type 
bomb’ [23]. 
Criteria for the assessment of plutonium disposition policy options 
The plutonium disposition methods will be assessed against the non-proliferation and feasibil-
ity criteria discussed in this section. These criteria are based on the fundamental assumptions 
that military plutonium is a threat to global security, as discussed in the introduction, and 
dispositioning military plutonium ‘is a long-term issue on which urgent action is needed’ [11].  
For obvious reasons, a disposition method that physically destroys the plutonium at hand 
is considered to be optimal. Failing complete physical destruction of the plutonium, the 
disposition method must create non-proliferation barriers by preventing the reuse of the 
plutonium for weapons purposes by its owner and preventing its theft by terrorists and other 
actors. These barriers should be political and technical [8]. Technical barriers include ‘physical, 
chemical, and radiological barriers to recovery of the plutonium’ [6]. That is, the effort needed 
to obtain the plutonium after it has been dispositioned must be prohibitive. The non-
proliferation measures must remain intact for at least several centuries. The implementation of 
the disposition method, including processing and transportation, must not introduce signifi-
cant proliferation risks [11]. Some countries, particularly the United States, have proposed the 
spent fuel standard as a guide by which the security of dispositioned plutonium should be 
assessed. This standard specifies that dispositioned plutonium should be as difficult to access 
as the plutonium in spent fuel from nuclear power reactors [16; p. 8, cited in 6]. In this article, 
the spent fuel standard will be used to establish a minimum threshold, but it will not be 
narrowly applied to reject disposition methods that make military plutonium more difficult to 
access than the plutonium in spent reactor fuel [6].   
The feasibility criteria for plutonium disposition involve timing, and technical and political 
requirements. The disposition method must be able to be implemented with reasonable start 
and completion times [33]. The process must not be excessively delayed by infrastructure or 
technology needs. For example, the approach must not rely on ‘the development, licensing, 
and construction of new types of reactors’ [11]. In addition, the implementation of the 
disposition method must not contravene any international treaties. 
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Do nothing option – national storage 
Before assessing the plutonium disposition options, it is necessary to examine the path of not 
taking any action to demonstrate that an active approach is required. In the do nothing option, 
military plutonium is simply left in assembled nuclear weapons or in stockpiles under its own-
ers’ control. This approach obviously meets feasibility criteria; however, it raises horizontal and 
vertical proliferation concerns. 
While it is true that military plutonium inside assembled nuclear weapons is often 
protected by physical access barriers such as sophisticated locking mechanisms and military 
personnel, the risk of horizontal proliferation due to weaknesses in physical protection of 
military facilities has been identified in some states. While the problems in Russia and the states 
of the former Soviet Union have been well publicised [41], security concerns have also been 
raised about other countries with nuclear weapons including the United States [7]. 
 The risk of horizontal proliferation also arises from present or potential political 
instability in some nuclear-weapon states, including states with weak civilian control over 
military plutonium and related decision-making [42]. Similarly, the facilities that contain 
military plutonium in states that are involved in regional and internal conflicts, including India, 
Israel and Pakistan, are potentially at risk of accidental or intentional attack.  
Considering that in the do nothing option the military plutonium remains under national 
control and presently most military plutonium is not under the supervision of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) [4], the risk of vertical proliferation is also present. Further-
more, the absence of vertical proliferation activities does not guarantee that they will not be 
undertaken in the future, especially in cases in which nuclear weapons have a central position 
in national security doctrines. 
Plutonium disposition – immobilisation 
The immobilisation method involves creating radiological and physical barriers to protect the 
plutonium from unwanted access. In one approach, known as the ‘can-in-canister’, an inner 
container of vitrified plutonium is placed within an outer container of highly radioactive waste. 
Another approach is to combine the plutonium and waste and then vitrify the mix [5]. The 
former approach is ‘technically simple and quicker to implement’ than the latter [6]. After the 
plutonium is immobilised, the end product is buried in an underground geological repository 
[8].  
The barriers against proliferation provided by plutonium immobilisation include the high 
radioactivity of the material and the difficulty of accessing the underground repository [6]. 
Limiting the amount of plutonium in each container to ensure that it is less than in spent 
nuclear fuel is ostensibly a disincentive to theft [8].  
Recognising that the plutonium is not actually destroyed in the vitrification process [6] and 
the radioactivity would decrease significantly in less than two centuries, the plutonium disposi-
tioned in this way ‘would be a mineable source for nuclear weapons for future generations’ 
[26]. While presently there are no industrial techniques to reprocess vitrified plutonium [12], 
the non-proliferation criteria remain unsatisfied, however, if it is assumed that such techniques 
will eventually be invented.  
The immobilisation approach also fails to satisfy feasibility criteria. No single uncontrover-
sial burial site has been identified anywhere in the world [24]. In addition to the time required 
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to identify an appropriate geological repository, time is also required to research the vitrifica-
tion process. Although vitrification is a well-known industrial technology, the vitrification of 
plutonium requires further research [8]. Furthermore, those states, including Russia, that con-
sider plutonium to be a desirable commercial energy source will likely reject immobilisation 
[12].  
Plutonium disposition – MOX fuel 
This option involves fabricating a nuclear fuel made from a mixture of plutonium and uranium 
oxides known as MOX, and irradiating it in nuclear power reactors. The end product of this 
activity is similar to that of the irradiation of normal uranium fuel. The radioactivity of both 
kinds of spent fuel is generated by the highly radioactive fission products [6]. The reprocessing 
of spent MOX fuel is presently not being considered, so it will most likely become radioactive 
waste [5].  
The non-governmental organisation Greenpeace has criticised the MOX fuel approach for 
creating ‘more plutonium than existed in the original MOX fuel’ [18]. While the overall process 
does create plutonium as a by-product of the irradiation of the uranium component in the 
MOX fuel and the standard uranium fuel that would accompany the MOX fuel, it is not clear 
that there would necessarily be a net gain in plutonium because a portion of the initial 
plutonium is destroyed during irradiation [20]. It is a fair criticism, however, that a process 
designed to treat plutonium in one form actually creates new plutonium in another form.  
The MOX fuel disposition approach creates non-proliferation barriers to protect the end 
product of the dispositioning process. The remaining plutonium is protected by the radiation 
emitted by the fission products. Since MOX spent fuel will likely be disposed of in underground 
repositories, given that this is the expected disposal method for non-MOX spent fuel [8], the 
handling and recovery difficulties associated with these locations offer some protection against 
theft. However, as with immobilised plutonium, the underground repositories of MOX spent 
fuel represent a source of plutonium that could be mined in the future [26].  
The fabrication and transportation steps required by the implementation of the MOX fuel 
disposition approach might make the plutonium vulnerable to theft. The radiological barrier to 
deter unwanted access only exists after the irradiation process, and would therefore not be 
present during the fabrication and transportation steps. In addition, only a basic level of 
scientific knowledge is required to extract the plutonium from un-irradiated MOX fuel. 
According to Frank Barnaby, the scientific knowledge needed is more basic ‘than that required 
for the illegal manufacture of designer drugs, or that employed by the Aum Shinrikyo cult in 
1995 to prepare sarin nerve gas for release into the Tokyo subway’ [cited in 27]. Some states 
may not have MOX fuel fabrication facilities or enough nuclear power reactors to process 
weapons plutonium in a reasonable period of time. Because it does not have enough suitable 
nuclear reactors, Russia may need to ship plutonium to other states to be irradiated [11]. To 
address the shortfall in nuclear reactors, one possibility is to burn MOX fuel made from Russian 
military plutonium in nuclear power stations in Canada. While this proposal would not violate 
the NPT if the material that is transferred to Canada is placed under IAEA safeguards [44], the 
transportation of MOX fuel between states introduces proliferation risks [2].   
Although MOX fuel fabrication plants already exists in Belgium, France and the United 
Kingdom [23], the dispositioning of plutonium as MOX fuel does not satisfy the feasibility 
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criteria. With regard to infrastructure requirements, ‘neither Russia nor the United States has 
industrial-scale MOX fuel production facilities’ [32], and, as mentioned previously, Russia does 
not have enough reactors available. In any case, the MOX fuel option cannot disposition all 
forms of military plutonium, so it is not a complete solution. For example, the United States 
estimates ‘that as much as one third of its own plutonium surplus stockpile will be too impure 
to fabricate into MOX fuel’ [6]. 
Plutonium disposition – other options 
Another approach is plutonium disposition by accelerator transmutation. In accelerator trans-
mutation, plutonium atoms are destroyed by nuclear fission [8]. Unlike in a nuclear weapon, 
the fission reactions in an accelerator are precisely controlled to prevent ‘the possibility for a 
runaway chain reaction’ [26]. 
It is not clear how much of the original plutonium would be destroyed in the transmuta-
tion process. James M. McCormick and Daniel B. Bullen posit that a large amount would be 
destroyed [26]; however, others suggest that ‘significant residues of…[the initial plutonium] 
would remain’ [8]. In any case, not all of the original plutonium is destroyed in the transmuta-
tion process. 
Plutonium disposition by accelerator transmutation does not mitigate against proliferation 
risks. The required processing of the plutonium introduces the opportunity for theft [8]. It is 
also not practical. The time needed for the research effort associated with accelerator transmu-
tation is prohibitive [26]. 
Another disposition approach involves launching plutonium into the sun. The suitably 
packaged plutonium is launched ‘into earth’s orbit. Then, by decelerating the payload to 
counter the spacecraft’s orbital velocity around the sun, the waste eventually would drop into 
the sun’ [26]. 
Solar disposal reduces proliferation risks to nil because all of the plutonium would be 
removed from earth and ostensibly destroyed in the sun. However, if the delivery vehicle 
accidentally returned to earth, there may be opportunities for theft if would-be proliferators 
could find and access the point of impact. Currently, dispositioning of plutonium by solar 
disposal is highly infeasible because it ‘would require many decades of development’ [29,26]. 
Another disposition approach is underground nuclear detonation. This involves subjecting 
buried plutonium to a nuclear explosion. Plutonium dispositioned in this way introduces 
proliferation risks because the plutonium may be vulnerable to theft if there is a delay between 
burial and detonation and the explosions could be used as an excuse to research new weapons 
technology. This proposal is impractical because a large number of detonations would be 
required [8]. Also, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty prohibits even peaceful 
nuclear explosions [45].  
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International plutonium storage 
The previous section showed that the currently proposed options for dispositioning plutonium 
have shortcomings when assessed against necessary non-proliferation and feasibility criteria. 
Therefore, international storage of military plutonium should be pursued until an acceptable 
plutonium disposition approach can be implemented. 
There are numerous models for international plutonium storage. They differ in their con-
ceptualisations of where the plutonium is stored and how easily it can be accessed. The inter-
national custody model and the plutonium prison model are discussed below.  
In the international custody model, plutonium is placed in the custody of the IAEA which 
already has the mandate in its statute ‘to require deposit with the Agency of any excess of any 
fissionable materials recovered or produced as a byproduct over what is needed’ and return 
deposited plutonium to the owner ‘provided that the material is used for peaceful purposes 
under continuing IAEA safeguards’ [46]. Deposited plutonium would continue to be legally 
owned by the state and would not be moved outside of its territory. By assuming custody of 
the plutonium, the IAEA would verify that domestic security meets international standards and 
block access to the plutonium except by legitimate requests for withdrawals [4]. The 
withdrawal of plutonium is envisaged to be ‘a routine matter based on the provision of a 
certificate of use’ in the spirit of the widely adopted International Plutonium Guidelines [4].     
In the plutonium prison model, military plutonium is moved to a single global repository 
and, unlike the international custody model, withdrawal of plutonium would be infrequent and 
difficult [13]. The repository would be protected by an international military presence and 
‘engineered features that would make it easy to move the material in quickly but hard to take 
out (collapsing tunnels, dismantled railroad tracks, etc.)’ [25]. 
Both models include political barriers to unwanted access. The centralised storage 
provided by the plutonium prison model represents a greater barrier to vertical proliferation. 
The author of this article believes that the military presence and physical protection afforded 
by the plutonium prison model give greater protection against external theft than the security 
measures in the international custody model. However, the transportation of plutonium to the 
global repository, although presumably under heavy guard, represents a proliferation risk. 
Noting that ‘national sovereignty has remained a basic principle in the management of 
plutonium’ [5], local storage in owner states is probably more politically acceptable than 
centralised international storage; however, the Japanese policy of not keeping any excess 
plutonium in Japan demonstrates that the international storage of plutonium, albeit when na-
tional ownership is maintained, is possible [4]. One practical problem with finding a location 
for the plutonium prison is that treaties defining nuclear free zones may prohibit the selection 
of certain locations. The Antarctic Treaty, for example, specifically forbids the ‘disposal there 
of radioactive waste material’ [47].  
Based on this discussion, the optimal design of an international plutonium storage 
programme appears to be a hybrid of the best features of the two models. The hybrid model 
would store plutonium in each owner state under the international custody of the IAEA 
supported by an international military presence. The plutonium would remain in custody until 
the termination of the programme. 
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Conclusion 
Dispositioning military plutonium is necessary to address the proliferation risks associated with 
its existence. Various methods have been proposed. One approach involves immobilising it in 
glass and burying it in underground repositories. Another approach involves making it into a 
nuclear fuel and burning it in nuclear power reactors. Other approaches include: altering its 
physical properties in an accelerator, launching it into the sun, and subjecting it to underground 
nuclear explosions. All of these approaches fail to satisfy necessary non-proliferation and 
feasibility criteria. This article recommends that international plutonium storage should be 
implemented until such time as a satisfactory disposition method is found. 
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